WebCheng Wang Address: School of Economics Fudan University Shanghai, China 200433 Phone: (86-21) 5566-5609 Email: [email protected] ... • Spear, Stephen E. and Cheng Wang (2005), “When to Fire a CEO: Optimal Termination in Dynamic Contracts,” Journal of Economic Theory 120: 239-256. WebTermination occurs after the CEO receives either a sufficiently high or a sufficiently low outside value. The model generates both voluntary and involuntary/forced turnovers, and counter-offers occur on the equilibrium path. The model is calibrated to the U.S. data to capture the key observed features of CEO pay and turnover.
Youzhi Yang IDEAS/RePEc
WebMay 19, 2024 · Following executive turnovers big bath accounting is often observed. We investigate a new manager’s earnings management incentives in his first year in office in a two-period model with career concerns and earnings’ lack of timeliness. We determine the optimal incentive contract and decompose the manager’s equilibrium earnings … WebMay 30, 2013 · Moving from Chen et al. (2013), and recognizing the heterogeneity of family firms (Chua et al. 2012), we propose a deeper analysis of the CEO turnover decisions in family-owned firms,... can abdominal ultrasound show appendicitis
Optimal CEO turnover - Research Papers in Economics
WebThey found that CEO turnover is significantly less sensitive to firm performance in firms with combined titles than in firms with separate titles. More recently, Nguyen (2011) concluded that French firms with one-tier boards show negative and significant CEO turnover-performance sensitivity. Based on the above arguments, we hypothesize as follows: WebAug 9, 2024 · A recent paper by Ghosh and Wang ( 2024) studies the case of turnover for publicly-traded Standard & Poor’s (S&P) 1500 firms for 1997–2013 and finds that CEO turnover is significantly higher for loss firms. Ghosh and Wang ( 2024) argue that CEOs are more likely to manage earnings to avoid losses to protect their jobs. Web• Spear, Stephen E. and Cheng Wang (2005), "When to Fire a CEO: Optimal Termination in Dynamic Contracts," Journal of Economic Theory 120: 239256 . • Wang, Cheng (2005), "Dynamic Costly State Verification," Economic Theory 25(4): 887 916. fish bottle glass